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ARTICLE
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The Role of Ethics Audits in Improving Management
Systems and Practices: An Empirical Examination of
Management-Based Regulation of Law Firms
Abstract. For decades, legal malpractice experts have urged lawyers to
implement risk management measures. To assist law firms in doing so, legal
malpractice insurers have provided audit services and self-audit materials. Under the
Australian regulatory regime, incorporated legal practices are required to complete a
self-assessment process and to report on the firm’s compliance with ten objectives of
sound law practice. Using management-based principles, this Article discusses steps to
take to encourage ethics audits “to merge good ethics and good business” in the U.S.
Author. Susan Saab Fortney serves as the Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished
Professor of Legal Ethics and Director of the Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics at
Maurice Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. Professor Fortney has
conducted various empirical studies on law firm ethics and liability. She works with
numerous bodies including The Professional Lawyer, the State Bar of Texas Committee
on the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, and the National Conference of
Bar Examiners Committee that drafts the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination. Texas Lawyer newspaper selected her as one of the Thirty Extraordinary
Women in Texas Law. In 2010, the Texas Bar Foundation awarded her the Lola
Wright Foundation Award for outstanding public service in advancing legal ethics.
She is a member of the American Law Institute, the Texas Bar Foundation, and the
American Bar Foundation.
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INTRODUCTION
On a weekly basis, articles in both legal newspapers and the popular
press question the relevance, cost, and application of legal education.1
This discussion adds another chapter to discourse on the role of law school
and legal educators. In the debate on the proper focus of law schools and
legal educators, Judge Harry Edwards of the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit challenged law schools and law firms to
examine the “disjunction” between the legal academy and the legal
profession.2 Judge Edwards questioned the emphasis on abstract theory,
arguing that the principal mission of law schools should be to produce
“scholarship that judges, legislators, and practitioners can use.”3
According to Judge Edwards, “‘practical’ scholarship . . . is not wholly
doctrinal.”4 Rather he noted that a “‘practical scholar’ gives due weight to
cases, statutes, and other authoritative texts, but also employs theory to
criticize doctrine, to resolve problems that doctrine leaves open, and to
propose changes in the law or in systems of justice.”5
At the time that Judge Edwards referred to the “disjunction,” Judge
Edwards may not have been aware of Ted Schneyer’s seminal article,
1. See TANIA KARAS, LAW SCHOOLS BOLSTER CLINIC OFFERINGS, N.Y. L.J. 5 (2013)
(describing how New York law schools are using clinics to help students develop practical lawyering
skills and prepare them for jobs); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Education: Rethinking the Problem,
Reimaging the Reforms, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 437, 438 (2013) (providing a scholarly analysis of the
concerns related to the future of legal education); Ethan Bronner, A Call for Drastic Changes in
Educating New Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/02/11/us/lawyers-call-for-drastic-change-in-educating-new-lawyers.html?_r=0 (referring to
testimony presented at hearings conducted by the American Bar Association’s Task Force of the
Future of Legal Education); Randall T. Shepard, Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, A.B.A.
CENTER FOR PROF. RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
taskforceonthefuturelegaleducation.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (indicating that the ABA Task
Force on the Future of Legal Education is “charged with making recommendations to the [ABA] on
how law schools, the ABA, and other groups and organizations can take concrete steps to address
issues concerning the economics of legal education and its delivery”).
2. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992) (expressing his concern that the legal education system
and the legal profession are growing in opposite directions). Subsequently, the Michigan Law Review
published a symposium issue focusing on the subject of the growing disjunction. See generally
Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1921 (1993) (responding to Judge Harry Edwards’s article).
3. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992).
4. Id. at 35.
5. See id. (noting that a good legal scholarship is not one dimensional); see also Richard A.
Danner, Oh, The Treatise!, 111 MICH. L. REV. 821, 822 (2013) (pointing out that in recent years,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy have also questioned the value of purely theoretical legal
scholarship).
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Professional Discipline in Law Firms.6 The article critically examined
problems facing practitioners and proposed changes to improve the
effectiveness of regulation of lawyers.7 Arguing that the professional
regulation should include the discipline of law firms, Professor Schneyer
analyzed how limiting discipline to individual lawyers does not address
various ethical breaches that arise from inadequate organizational controls
and deficiencies in the ethical infrastructure of law firms.8 Professor
Schneyer first used the term “ethical infrastructure” to refer to “a law firm’s
organization, policies, and operating procedures . . . that cut[] across
particular lawyers and tasks.”9 Professor Schneyer suggested that “[t]he
chief reason to allow disciplinary authorities to proceed directly against law
firms is prophylaxis—the promotion of firm practices that prevent
wrongdoing by individual lawyers.”10 As discussed below, Professor
Schneyer’s work on the discipline and ethical infrastructure of law firms
has influenced lawyers, academics, jurists, and regulators around the
world.11
Following the publication of Professor Schneyer’s article, the high court
in New York revised the state’s professional conduct rules to provide for
discipline of law firms as entities.12 Although few firms have been
disciplined, the possibility of entity discipline should motivate firm leaders
to devote time and resources to implement policies and procedures to
promote ethical conduct.13
In focusing attention on the connection between ethical conduct and

6. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34–35 (1992). See generally Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for
Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1991) (studying the regulation of lawyers in the current legal
climate).
7. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13 (1991)
(proposing the creation of ethical norms for law firms as a whole, rather than for individual lawyers).
8. Professor Schneyer uses five well-published incidents involving large law firms to illustrate
how misconduct may not be attributable to the conduct of individual lawyers. Id. at 4–5.
9. Id. at 10.
10. Id. at 14.
11. The Festschrift for Ted Schneyer examined his many contributions, focusing on Lawyer
Regulation for the 21st Century. See Bruce A. Green, Foreword—The Legal Ethics Scholarship of Ted
Schneyer: The Importance of Being Rigorous, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 365, 365 (2011) (examining Schneyer’s
many contributions to lawyer regulation in the 21st century).
12. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2013); see also Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Professional
Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 2
(2002) (providing background on firm discipline proposals).
13. See Thomas D. Morgan, The Rise of Institutional Law Practice, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1005,
1005–07 (2012) (examining the rise in institutional practice and the importance of organizational
controls).
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firm systems and controls, Professor Schneyer’s work may have also
contributed to regulators’ and jurists’ willingness to rely on the state
versions of ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1, which requires
that a partner in a law firm “make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the
firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.”14 Although there are
relatively few disciplinary cases citing Rule 5.1(a), opinions increasingly
refer to the importance of firm managers making reasonable efforts to
ensure that all lawyers in the firm comply with the ethics rules.15
In the United States, other scholars relied on Professor Schneyer’s work
that called for law firms to focus more on fortifying their ethical
infrastructure.16 Some examined the implementation and impact of ethics
systems and controls.17 A few have called for more research examining the
role of ethical infrastructure.18
Outside the United States, commentators and bar leaders joined the
chorus by seriously considering the role of ethical infrastructure in
influencing lawyer conduct.19 This examination has informed regulatory
changes in both the United Kingdom and Australia.
In the United Kingdom, the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) has
shifted to outcomes-based regulation that focuses on high-level principles
and outcomes that drive the provision of legal services to consumers.20
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2013); see Susan Saab Fortney, Am I My
Partner’s Keeper? Peer Review in Law Firms, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 329, 348–58 (1995) (providing a
discussion of Model Rule 5.1(a) and a partner’s duty to monitor or supervise other firm lawyers).
15. See Joan C. Rogers, Law Partners and Managers Must Be Active Overseers of Colleagues’
Conduct, 28 ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT, CURRENT REPORTS 71 (Feb. 1,
2012), available at www.bna.com/law-partners-managers-n12884907572/ (commenting on the
responsibility of law firm managers and cases applying ABA Model Rules 5.1(a), 5.3, and the
comparable Restatement of Law Governing Lawyer sections).
16. See Alex B. Long, Whistleblowing Attorneys and Ethical Infrastructures, 68 MD. L. REV. 786,
788–89 (2009) (recommending that firms adopt procedures to promote internal reporting of ethics
concerns and providing formal protections against retaliation for reporting).
17. See Susan Saab Fortney & Jett Hanna, Fortifying a Firm’s Ethical Infrastructure: Avoiding
Legal Malpractice Claims Based on Conflicts of Interest, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 669, 690 (2002)
(describing the various systems that firms employ to check the quality of their ethics systems).
18. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructures in
Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 693 (2002)
(explaining the importance of having a sound ethical infrastructure in place).
19. See, e.g., Christine Parker et al, The Ethical Infrastructure of Legal Practice in Larger Law
Firms: Values, Policy and Behavior, 31 U. NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 158, 159 (2008) (stating how
ethical behavior effects the entire firm and not just individual lawyers).
20. See Outcomes-Focused Regulation, SOLIC. REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.sra.org.uk/
solicitors/freedom-in-practice/outcomes-focused-regulation.page (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (noting
that outcomes-focused regulation “replaces a detailed and prescriptive rulebook with a targeted, risk-
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The SRA Authorization Rules now require firms to appoint compliance
personnel to oversee risk management and governance matters.21 These
compliance officers are responsible for ensuring that their firms implement
systems and controls to enable firm members to meet the requirements set
forth in the Solicitors Handbook.22 In describing effective compliance
arrangements, the SRA urges solicitors to consider the infrastructure of the
firm.23
In adopting a form of management-based firm regulation, Australian
jurisdictions have taken a somewhat different approach in addressing
organizational controls and consumer protection.24 Legislators in the state
of New South Wales (NSW) in Australia first took the pioneering step of
integrating the concept of “ethical infrastructure” into the statute, allowing
legal practitioners to incorporate their law practices with no restrictions on
non-lawyer ownership.25
based approach concentrating on the standards of service to consumers”); see also Susan Saab Fortney,
Assessing How Lawyers Keep Their Own Houses Clean: Baseline Report on Outcomes-Focused Regulation,
JOTWELL (Feb. 21, 2013), http://legalpro.jotwell.com/assessing-how-lawyers-keep-their-ownhouses-clean-baseline-report-on-outcomes-focused-regulation/ (reviewing an extensive report on the
outcomes-based regulation in the UK).
21. See Outcomes-Focused Regulation at a Glance, SOLIC. REG. AUTHORITY,
http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/freedom-in-practice/OFR/ofr-quick-guide.page (updated Oct. 10,
2011) (explaining that the new method allows for greater flexibility while also providing better care to
consumers).
22. See id. (detailing the requirements and responsibilities of the compliance officers).
23. Id.; see Gerard Starkey, Law Firm Name First Compliance Officers for New Regulatory
Regime, LEGAL WK. (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/news/2235368/lawfirms-name-first-compliance-officers-as-sra-pushes-on-with-new-regulatory-regime
(stating
that
compliance officers are “the key SRA contact point at their law firms, taking responsibility for
systems and controls and ensuring risk is appropriately managed”); see also Compliance Officers, THE
L. SOC’Y (May 2, 2013), http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/articles/compliance-officers/
(explaining “the role of compliance officers”).
24. See Steven Mark & Georgina Cowdroy, Incorporated Legal Practices—A New Era in the
Provision of Legal Services in the State of New South Wales, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 671, 671
(2004) (detailing the legislation that made the new management-based firm regulations possible). See
generally Steve Mark, Regulating For Professionalism: The New South Wales Approach, OFF. OF THE
LEGAL SERVS. COMMISSIONER (NSW) (Aug. 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/events/ethics_2020/steve_mark_posting.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing the potentially
competing interests of regulation and professionalism).
25. Steven Mark, Regulating For Professionalism: The New South Wales Approach, OFF. OF THE
LEGAL SERVS. COMMISSIONER (NSW) 9–11 (Aug. 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/events/ethics_2020/steve_mark_posting.authcheckdam.pdf. Other states in Australia have
enacted similar legislation requiring that incorporated firms implement AMS and appoint a legal
practitioner director who becomes responsible for the firm’s ethical infrastructure. See Incorporated
Legal Practices and Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships, LEGAL SERVS. COMMISSION, http://www.lsc.qld.
gov.au/compliance/incorporated-legal-practices/appropriate-management-systems (last visited Mar.
19, 2014) (providing an overview of the regulatory framework in Queensland).
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To allay concerns related to non-lawyer ownership and limited liability,
the statute imposes a number of management and practice safeguards.26
First, the incorporated legal practice (ILP) must appoint a legal
practitioner director to be “generally responsible for the management of
legal services provided” by the ILP.27 Second, the statute provides that the
legal practitioner director must ensure that “appropriate management
systems are implemented and maintained to enable the provision of those
legal services in accordance with . . . obligations imposed by [law].”28
Because the statute did not define “appropriate management systems”
(AMS), Steve Mark, the Legal Services Commissioner for NSW, worked
with various stakeholders to develop “ten objectives of sound legal
practice.”29 The Office for the Legal Services Commissioner (LSC) also
devised an “education toward compliance” approach in which the ILP
must complete a self-assessment process (SAP).30 In this SAP, ILPs
complete a Self-Assessment Form (SAF), reporting on their compliance
with each of the ten objectives.31
Professor Ted Schneyer credits the NSW program with giving content
to the term “ethical infrastructure” by “identifying ten types of recurring
problems that infrastructure should be designed to prevent or at least
mitigate.”32 Because the “education toward compliance” approach focuses

26. Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility of Recent U.K. and Australian Reforms with
U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law Practice, 2009 PROF. LAW. 13, 31 (referring to concerns related to
non-lawyer ownership and limited liability).
27. Steven Mark & Georgina Cowdroy, Incorporated Legal Practices—A New Era in the
Provision of Legal Services in the State of New South Wales, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 671, 681
(2004) (outlining the roles and responsibilities of the solicitor director).
28. See id. at 686 (explaining the strict compliance regulations to which the practitioner
director must adhere).
29. See id. at 689–90 (listing the objectives of the education towards compliance strategy).
30. See id. at 689 (stating that the ILPs must demonstrate that they have a program in place
that is congruent with the ten objectives previously described).
31. See id. at 691 (explaining that the SAF requires the legal practitioner director to evaluate
firm practices and rate management systems using a template). If the completed form indicates that a
firm is non-compliant or partially compliant, a staff member with the LSC provides the ILP written
guidance and requests confirmation of steps to achieve compliance. See id. (recognizing that the selfassessment form is a required element of the ILP review program); see also Susan Fortney & Tahlia
Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive and Thrive: A Study of the Australian
Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J. 152, 152 (2012) (highlighting Tahlia
Gordon’s contributions as the Research and Project Manager for the Office of the Legal Services
Commissioner for NSW).
32. Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection: How “Professional Self-Regulation” Should Promote
Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 576, 585 (2011).
Professor Schneyer also expanded on the description of “ethical infrastructure,” noting that it
consists of “policies, procedures, systems, and structures—in short, the ‘measures’ that ensure lawyers
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on prevention and mitigation, Professor Schneyer describes the NSW
program as a prototype for “proactive, management based regulation.”33
Unlike reactive regulation that disciplines lawyers for violating particular
rules, the management-based objectives address the principles of sound
practice.34 In addition, the SAF provides strategies to address concerns
that commonly result in complaints against practitioners.35
The proactive approach to regulation has captured the attention of a
number of commentators and researchers.36 Notably, in 2008, Dr.
Christine Parker conducted an empirical study assessing the impact of the
NSW program on the number of complaints relating to ILPs.37 The
study found that rate of complaints for ILPs went down by two-thirds after
the ILP completed its initial self-assessment.38 Another noteworthy
finding was that the rate of complaints for ILPs that completed the SAP
was one-third of the number of complaints registered against nonincorporated legal practices.39 The researchers recommended further
investigation utilizing other research methods because the rate of
complaints largely reflected consumer service issues and did not address
other ethics concerns, such as duties to the court and other ethical issues
that are of less concern to clients.40
To obtain more data on the impact of the AMS and the SAP and to
identify possible measures to improve management-based regulation of
firms, I conducted a mixed method study in 2012, combining a survey
in their firm comply with their ethical duties and that non-lawyers associated with the firm behave in
a manner consistent with the lawyers’ duties.” Id.
33. Id. at 584.
34. Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive and
Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J. 152,
161 (2012) (providing fluid guidelines as opposed to specific rules that were previously used).
35. See id. at 162 (explaining the rudimentary nature of the self-assessment form); see also SelfAssessment Process, OFF. OF LEGAL SERVS. COMMISSIONER, http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/
agdbasev7wr/olsc/documents/pdf/self_assessment_form_january2014. pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
2014) (providing access to the SAF).
36. See Christine E. Parker, Tahlia Gordon, & Steve A. Mark, Regulating Law Firm Ethics
Management: An Empirical Assessment of the Regulation of Incorporated Legal Practices in NSW, 37 J.L.
SOC’Y 466, 469 (2010) (arguing that ethical regulation within the legal profession must focus on law
firms at large rather than exclusively on individual lawyers).
37. See id. at 466 (presenting an evaluation of the management-based regulation scheme).
38. See id. at 483, 485 (analyzing the SAFs and complaints data relating to 620 ILPs).
39. See id. at 488 (explaining that the improvement was “statistically significant at the highest
level”). On a third hypothesis that related to levels of implementation of AMS, the researchers found
little evidence that the actual rating that firms gave themselves for implementation of management
systems made a difference in the number of complaints. See id. at 491 (emphasizing the important
role that the self-assessment process has in reducing the complaints rates).
40. See id. at 498 (suggesting areas of further research to better understand the results).
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with interviews. Another article analyzes survey findings related to the
implementation and development of AMS, as well as the effects of the
SAP.41 This Article draws on those findings, focusing on the value of
ethics audits in improving ethical conduct by lawyers.
Part I of this Article describes the hypotheses and methodology used in
the study. Part II summarizes pertinent survey findings relating to the
effects of AMS and the SAP. Part III identifies steps that can be taken to
encourage lawyers and their firms to engage in self-assessment. The
conclusion explains the foundational role that ethics assessments can play
in reducing lawyers’ liability while improving the delivery of legal services.
PART I - RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
For the study, the primary research questions were: (1) what is the
relationship between the self-assessment and the ethical norms, systems,
conduct, and culture in firms, and (2) how can the SAP be improved? To
answer these questions, I conducted a mixed method study in
collaboration with the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner for NSW
(LSC).
In phase one, I obtained survey data using an online questionnaire.42
The questionnaire sought information on approaches, perspectives, effects,
and experiences related to the AMS implementation and the SAP.43 The
target group for the survey consisted of 356 ILPs with two or more
solicitors.44
A total of 141 directors with ILPs completed the
questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 39.6%.45 The respondents

41. See Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J.
152, 155 (2012) (examining the relationship between self-assessment procedures and the ethical
culture in firms).
42. SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, QUESTIONNAIRE, at 1
(2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal); see also Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting
Law Firm Management Systems to Survive and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to
Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J. 152, 168 (2012) (indicating that the
questionnaire contained thirty-one multipart items, space for text entries, and a section for additional
comments).
43. SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, QUESTIONNAIRE, at 1
(2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal).
44. See Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J.
152, 168–69 (2012) (specifying that only ILPs that were incorporated between January 1, 2007 and
January 1, 2011 were invited to participate in the survey).
45. See id. at 168–70 (discussing the development of the methodology, the response rate, and
bias).
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represented firms of varying sizes.46
In the second stage of the study, we interviewed directors from ILPs
with two or more solicitors.47 Maxine Evers, Senior Lecturer at the
University of Technology in Sydney, conducted approximately half of the
interviews. We systematically pulled the names of firms and invited
designated directors from those firms to participate in interviews.48
Interview questions allowed for follow-up on issues covered in the
questionnaire. The interviews also provided an opportunity to explore in
more detail the directors’ experiences with implementing AMS and
completing the SAP as well as their opinions on improving the SAP and
the regulation of firms.49 Respondents were advised that the study was
being conducted in cooperation with the LSC and were informed of steps
taken to protect the anonymity of their responses.50
PART II - SELECT SURVEY FINDINGS
A number of survey items addressed the following question: What is the
relationship between self-assessment and the ethical norms, systems,
conduct, and culture in firms?51 One question specifically asked
respondents to note the steps taken after the firm’s first completion of the
SAP. The majority (71%) indicated that they revised firm systems,
policies, and procedures and 47% reported that they actually adopted new

46. See SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, RESULTS, at Question 1
(2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (reporting the following categories for respondent
firms by size: 1-2 solicitors (10%), 3-9 solicitors (78%), 10-19 solicitors (7%), and 20 or more
solicitors (5%)). Geographically, the respondents were close to evenly divided between firms with
home offices in Sydney and firms with home offices in other communities in NSW.
47. See Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J.
152, 168 (2012) (explaining that limiting the study in this manner would yield “data on the impact
of the AMS and SAP on firm dynamics”).
48. We continued to systematically pull names and invite respondents until we had over forty
individuals who agreed to be interviewed.
49. Although each interviewer followed a four-page interview template, the session allowed for
follow-up discussion of issues and concerns that arose during the interview.
50. Steps included scrubbing transcripts so that they did not include any identifying
information. Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J.
152, 168 (2012).
51. See, e.g., SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, QUESTIONNAIRE,
at Question 12–13 (2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (asking what steps the interviewer
took upon completion of the SAP and whether certain aspects of the firm culture changed as a
result).
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systems, policies, and procedures.52 Forty-two percent indicated that they
“strengthened firm management” following the completion of the first
SAF.53 For most steps taken by firms in connection with the SAP, there
was no significant difference related to firm size and the steps taken.54
Analyzed together, these results and others suggest that the SAP
contributed to firms of all sizes taking steps to fortify the firms’ ethical
infrastructures.55
Results also indicate that the SAP was an educational experience for the
majority of respondents. Sixty-two percent indicated that they agreed or
strongly agreed with the following statement: the self-assessment process
“was a learning exercise that enabled our firm to improve client service.”56
Only 15% disagreed or strongly disagreed.57 These responses and text
entries indicate that the education toward compliance approach works in
providing firm directors the incentives, tools, and authority to take steps to
improve the delivery of legal services. A smaller percentage of respondents
noted that the SAP enhanced awareness of ethics issues.58
To obtain additional information on the extent of the impact of the
SAP, a multi-part inquiry asked respondents to rate impact on the
following scale: (1) “no impact,” (2) “some impact,” and (3) “high
impact.”59 For analysis purposes, I grouped the responses in four
categories: management, client/professionalism concerns, ethics concerns,
and firm dynamics. The following graphic sets forth the average ratings
for items in these categories.60

52. Id. at Question 12.
53. Id.
54. See id. at Question 1, 12 (noting that this figure is based on a cross-tabulation of Questions
1 and 12). When it came to implementation of training following the self-assessment process, there
was a trend in which larger firms reported that they implemented training more than smaller ones.
Id. at Question 12.
55. See Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J.
152, 173 (2012) (outlining various steps that firms reported taking following the first selfassessment).
56. See SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, RESULTS, at Question
19 (2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (noting that 55% of respondents checked that
they “agree” with the statement and 7% reported that they “strongly agree” with the statement).
57. See id. at Question 19 (reporting that 11% of respondents checked that they “disagree”
with the statement and 4% reported that they “strongly disagree” with the statement).
58. See id. at Question 19 (reporting that approximately 45% of respondents “agree” or
“strongly agree” that SAP enhanced ethics awareness).
59. Id. at Question 13.
60. See id. (indicating a trend in which directors at smaller firms reported that the selfassessment process impacted supervision at a higher rate than that reported by directors at larger
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As indicated by the results summarized in the graphic, the largest
percentage of respondents reported that the greatest impact was on matters
related to firm management and risk management, followed by impact on
client service matters. The respondents’ ratings of the impact on general
ethics concerns and firm dynamics were lower. These results can be
attributed to the fact that the items covered in the SAF largely deal with
practice management issues that commonly result in firm concerns related
to client complaints, such as cost disclosure and fee recovery.
Although many of the items covered in the SAF relate to proper
conduct under applicable law, the aggregate results suggest that
respondents did not perceive that the SAP impacted ethics conduct,
leadership, and culture as much as management and client service issues.
This conclusion is supported by other responses indicating that a smaller
percentage of firms are implementing measures related to general ethics
concerns, as opposed to measures and controls that the SAF expressly
covers.61 Similarly, more respondents report that their firms implemented

firms). This is based on a cross-tabulation between the responses to Questions 1 and 13. See id.
(excluding this finding, there was no significant difference between the impact reported by
respondents and firm size).
61. For example, only 37% of the respondents indicated that their firms did not have a director
or committee appointed to direct ethics initiatives. Id. at Question 28. By comparison, 76% of
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measures specifically described in the SAF, but a smaller number of
respondents used controls not described in the SAF.62
These results point to an overarching question related to the effect of
the SAP. Does the process contribute to serious examination of firm
practices, policies, and systems, or does the SAP result in firms using the
SAF as a checklist, simply implementing the specific practices, policies and
procedures described in the SAF? Even worse, does the SAP result in a
meaningless box checking exercise in which directors simply go through
the SAF checking that their firms are “compliant” without serious
examination of firm practices? In the survey, 12% of respondents agreed
with the statement that the SAP amounted to meaningless “box ticking.”63
In evaluating survey responses and interview results, directors’
experiences and perspectives appear to fall on a continuum. At one end, a
relatively small percentage of respondents may be simply checking boxes
and reporting that their firms are compliant without actual review of firm
policies.64 The mid-continuum point is represented by the large
percentage of respondents who report that they used the SAF as a learning
process to review and revise existing policies, as well as adopt new ones.65
At a minimum, these firm representatives are addressing those matters that
are expressly described in the SAF form.66 At the far end of the
continuum are those firm respondents who have been inspired by the SAF
to take management systems to the next level.67 These respondents
recognize the business imperative in adopting management systems to

respondents reported that their firms had appointed a director or committee to handle risk
management. Id.
62. See id. at Question 24 (illustrating the fact that 92% of respondents indicated that their
firms had a practice for verifying credentials and certifications of all practitioners, a supervisory
control identified in the SAF). On the other hand, only 66% reported that their firms made a regular
practice of having a director (not involved in the representation) periodically review all current files.
Id.
63. See id. at Question 18 (finding that 66% of respondents disagreed that “SAP amounts to
meaningless box ticking,” while 22% neither agreed nor disagreed).
64. See Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J.
152, 170 (2012) (suggesting the existence of a potential bias in the survey because directors could be
concerned about what their responses would reveal).
65. See SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, RESULTS, at Question
18 (2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (demonstrating that 55% of survey takers believed
that the SAP was useful as a learning exercise).
66. See id. (noting that 56% of respondents believed that adopting the AMS “reduced the
firm’s professional liability of risk”).
67. See id. (revealing that 7% of those surveyed strongly agreed that the SAP was a positive
learning tool).
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make their firms more competitive in attracting and retaining clients.68 A
small group of respondents who recognize the value of management
systems are going beyond the minimum required by the SAF and seeking a
Quality Management Certification under the guidelines adopted by the
International Organization for Standards.69 Firms might use such
certifications to distinguish themselves for business development purposes.
PART III - INTEGRATING MANAGEMENT-BASED PRINCIPLES
The research findings discussed above indicate that lawyers’ selfassessment makes a real difference in educating lawyers by first evaluating
their firm practices, and second, by developing systems. As revealed by
respondents’ reports of the impact of the SAP, the greatest impact was on
firm management, risk management, and supervision. The survey findings
relating to the dramatic decrease in the number of complaints suggest that
lawyers can reduce their exposure for liability for disciplinary complaints
by evaluating firm practices and improving firm controls.70 These
findings may capture the attention of some practitioners, contributing to
them going through the SAP.
Although the data is compelling, most practitioners may need
additional incentives or a push to get them to devote the time to seriously
examining firm processes. In Australia, the regulatory implementation of
legislation mandating that incorporated firms implement appropriate
management systems requires designated practitioners to complete the
SAP.71 Opinions reported in my study revealed that a number of the
respondents questioned or even opposed being required to complete an

68. See id. (showing that a total of 62% of respondents believed that the SAP enables their firm
to improve client service).
69. See id. at Question 14 (surveying benefits incurred by the SAP); see also Certification To ISO
Management System Standard, INT’L. ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/
iso/home/standards/certification.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (describing some of the
certifications that use the ISO standards and differentiating between ISO standards and autonomous
certification groups); Law 9000 Legal Best Practice, SAI GLOBAL, https://www.saiglobal.com/
assurance/legal-best-practice/LAW9000.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (exemplifying a certification
system for legal practices).
70. See id. at Question 18 (revealing that 40% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that
“AMS reduced the number of client complaints,” versus only 19% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing
that client complaints had gone down).
71. See Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J.
152, 171 (2012) (explaining the regulation in Australia where a designated practitioner must
complete the SAP).
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SAF.72 Thirty-three of the 137 responding critics indicated that their
opinions changed following completion of the SAP.73 This experience
points to the importance of taking steps to encourage lawyers to examine
their practices as part of a risk management and practice improvement
program.
The steps taken may depend on a variety of factors, including the state’s
disciplinary procedures, bar programs, and insurer support for risk
management initiatives. Progressive regulators, insurers, and bar leaders
who find data to be persuasive should be more willing to take steps to
encourage lawyers to engage in self-examination of firm practices and
systems. The following discussion considers specific steps that can be
taken to spur lawyers and firms to systematically examine their practices
and controls.
A. Regulatory Mandate Related to Alternative Business Structures
Outside of Australia, other jurisdictions are now seriously considering
regulatory reforms, including risk-based approaches to regulation.
Regulators in a number of Canadian provinces are exploring regulatory
reforms and studying the experiences in England and Australia.74 For
example, the Director of Professional Responsibility for the Nova Scotia
Barristers’ Society recommends that the Council for the Nova Scotia
Barristers’ Society consider the following changes:
[A]dopting a proactive approach with lawyer and law firms through
education, engagement, the creation of an appropriate management systemsbased approach, and the provision of tools and training to help firms of all
sizes practice ethically and competently in the public interest and develop an
embedded ethical infrastructure . . . [and] allowing firms the room to
establish appropriate management systems that suit the nature of their
clientele and to demonstrate their effectiveness, then refocus our attention
and resources on supporting sole practitioners and small firms in achieving
appropriate management systems and avoiding problems . . . .75

72. See SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, RESULTS, at Question
22 (2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (demonstrating the opinions of respondents
regarding the required SAP).
73. See id. at Question 9 (soliciting respondents’ opinions on concerns regarding the SAP).
74. See THE LAW SOC’Y OF UPPER CANADA, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMITTEE
REPORT,
REPORT
TO
CONVOCATION,
at
432–36
(2013),
available
at
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147495044 (summarizing different
approaches used in Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada).
75. Victoria Rees, Transforming Regulation and Governance in the Public Interest, NOVA SCOTIA
BARRISTERS’ SOC’Y 51 (Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/cms/news/
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This excerpt from the report suggests that regulators in other countries
recognize the value of a proactive “education toward compliance” approach
that encourages lawyers and their firms to improve their management
systems.76 As these regulators study the possibility of relaxing prohibitions
on alternative business structures, management-based principles may be a
feature of the new regulatory regime. This is similar to the approach used
in Australia where the new regulatory approach and SAP evolved out of the
legislation lifting restrictions on non-lawyer ownership of incorporated
legal practices.77
After other jurisdictions join the United Kingdom and Australia in
allowing non-lawyer ownership of law firms, the American Bar Association
(“ABA”) and state regulators may revisit modifying disciplinary rules that
prohibit non-lawyer ownership of law firms.78 Any changes in the current
rules will need to address the critics who argue that non-lawyer ownership
will undermine core values of the legal profession and public protection.79
Except for the staunchest critics of changing current prohibitions, the
reservations of some might be addressed by requiring that safeguards be
implemented at firms with non-lawyer owners. These controls could
include requiring that the firms appoint a general counsel and demonstrate
that the firm has in place proper management systems to give reasonable
assurance that firm lawyers act in accordance with their professional
obligations.
B. Use of Management-Based Approaches As an Alternative to Discipline
Given the strong opposition to allowing non-lawyer ownership of law
firms in the United States, it may be many years until the restrictions on

2013-10-30transformingregulation.pdf.
76. Id. at 62 (quoting Amy Salyzn, What if We Didn’t Wait? Promoting Ethical Infrastructure in
Canadian Law Firms, SLAW (Jul. 25 2013) available at http://www.slaw.ca/2013/07/25/what-if-wedidnt-wait-promoting-ethical-infrastructure-in-canadian-law-firms/).
77. See id. at 37 (summarizing Australian legal ownership regulations, which allow non-lawyers
to have co-ownership of law firms).
78. In 2012, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 considered proposing a limited form of
non-lawyer ownership in law firms, but decided to remove the idea following strong opposition.
Debra Cassens Weiss, ABA House Postpone Resolution Reaffirming Opposition to Nonlawyer Ownership
of Law Firms, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 6, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/resolution_confirms_aba_stance_against_nonlawyer_ownership_of_law_firms/.
79. See id. (describing the votes to close the resolution); see also James D. Moliterno, The
Trouble with Lawyer Regulation, 62 EMORY L.J. 885, 866–87 (2013) (critiquing the “backward
looking” and “self-preserving” perspectives of lawyers who oppose non-lawyer ownership of law
firms).
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non-lawyer ownership are changed.80 Until that time, there are other
opportunities for integrating management-based principles into the
regulation of lawyers. One avenue that is currently employed in many
states is to use diversion programs as an alternative to discipline.81 After
reviewing the genesis of these programs and the approach used in current
diversion programs, this section discusses the value of broader use of
diversion programs to deal with minor misconduct and practice
management concerns.
Over forty years ago, a Special Committee on Evaluation of
Disciplinary Enforcement, chaired by former U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Tom Clark, issued a report analyzing problems related to disciplinary
enforcement (“the Clark Report”).82 The Clark Report noted that one
deficiency was that disciplinary procedures failed to address matters
involving minor misconduct.83
Twenty years later, the ABA’s Commission on the Evaluation of
Disciplinary Enforcement, chaired by Robert McKay (“the McKay
Commission”), issued a report that addressed the need for procedures to
deal with minor misconduct and the need to provide practice management
guidance to lawyers.84 The McKay Commission recommended the
establishment of Law Practice Assistance Committees to consider cases
referred to the committees and to aid lawyers voluntarily seeking

80. James D. Moliterno, The Trouble with Lawyer Regulation, 62 EMORY L.J. 885, 903 (2013)
(asserting that “lawyer-dominated legislatures” and “professional resistance” will likely stymie
statutory changes that allow for non-lawyer ownership and Alternative Business Structures).
81. See ARIZONA ATTORNEY DIVERSION GUIDELINES ADOPTED BY THE ARIZONA SUPREME
COURT, AZ. BAR (2011), available at http://www.azbar.org/media/66357/diversion%20
guidelines%20effective%2001-01-11.pdf (outlining the guidelines for the diversion program in
Arizona); see also Diane M. Ellis, Is Diversion A Viable Alternative to Traditional Discipline?: An
Analysis of the First Ten Years in Arizona, PROF. LAW., Fall 2002, at 1 (discussing the diversion
program in Arizona).
82. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFOREMENT, FINAL DRAFT (1970), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/reports/Clark_Report.authcheckdam.
pdf.
83. See id. at 92–95 (examining problems associated with the lack of admonitory procedures to
deal with minor misconduct). The Clark Report recommended that disciplinary agencies be
authorized to issue “informal admonitions in disposing of complaints involving” minor misconduct.
Id.; see also Diane M. Ellis, Is Diversion A Viable Alternative to Traditional Discipline?: An Analysis of
the First Ten Years in Arizona, PROF. LAW., Fall 2002, at 1, 4 (discussing the key concerns related to
the lack of admonitory procedures).
84. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, LAWYER
REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY (1992), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility/resources/report_archive/mckay_report.html.
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assistance.85
The McKay Commission also recommended that
“jurisdictions should adopt procedures in lieu of discipline for matters in
which a lawyer’s actions constitute minor misconduct, minor
incompetence, or minor neglect.”86 As stated in the recommendation,
disciplinary counsel and the respondent lawyer may agree to submit the
minor misconduct matter to non-disciplinary proceedings that “may
consist of fee arbitration, arbitration, mediation, lawyer practice assistance
. . . or any other non-disciplinary proceedings.”87
Following the McKay Commission Report, the ABA amended their
Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement to expressly provide for
alternatives to discipline.88 Under the amended rules, alternative
discipline is available for instances of “lesser misconduct.”89 Prior to filing

85. See id. at Recommendation 4 (“The Committee should provide guidance to the lawyer
including, when appropriate: (a) review of the lawyer’s office and case management practices and
recommendations for improvement: and (b) review of the lawyer’s substantive knowledge of the law
and recommendations for further study.”). Comments to the recommendation noted that the
Committee could provide direct supervision and guidance or recommend other resources such as
office management classes or substance abuse counseling. Id.
86. Id. at Recommendation 9.
87. Id.; see also id. at Recommendation 10 (setting forth expedited procedures for handling
instances of minor misconduct); Diane M. Ellis, Is Diversion A Viable Alternative to Traditional
Discipline?: An Analysis of the First Ten Years in Arizona, PROF. LAW., Fall 2002, at 1, 4 (explaining
that the ABA adopted the McKay Commission recommendations in 1992).
88. Joseph Roszkowski, Hot ABA Annual Meeting Subjects, R.I. B.J., Nov. 1996, at 13, 15
(noting that in 1996, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution adding the alternatives to
discipline provisions to Rule 11 of the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement). “The
Philadelphia Bar Association and the ABA standing Committees on Professional Discipline, Ethics
and Professional Responsibility and Lawyers’ Responsibility for Client Protection” sponsored the
amendment. Conference Draws Record Attendance, PROF. LAW, Aug. 1996, at 20, 24 (reporting on an
ABA National Conference on Professional Responsibility panel that discussed how alternatives to
discipline best address causes of lawyer incompetence).
89. Rule 9(2) under the ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement states that
“[l]esser misconduct is conduct that does not warrant a sanction restricting the respondent’s license to
practice law.” MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 9(2) (2002), available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/lawyer_ethics_regulation/
model_rules_for_lawyer_disciplinary_enforcement.html. The rule states that conduct shall not be
viewed as lesser misconduct if:
(1) the misconduct involves the misappropriation of funds;
(2) the misconduct results in or is likely to result in substantial prejudice to a client or
other person;
(3) the respondent has been publically disciplined in the last three years;
(4) the misconduct is of the same nature as misconduct for which the respondent has been
disciplined in the last five years;
(5) the misconduct involves dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation by the
respondent;
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formal charges, Model Rule of Disciplinary Enforcement R.11 empowers
disciplinary counsel to refer matters involving lesser misconduct to the
Alternatives to Discipline Program.90 As provided in the rule, alternatives
to discipline may include “fee arbitration, arbitration, mediation, law office
management assistance, lawyer assistance programs, psychological
counseling, continuing legal education programs, ethics school or any
other program authorized by the court.”91 The rule sets forth factors for
determining if a referral is appropriate.92 It also describes the mechanics
for handling the referral, including notice to complainant and
documentation of the terms of the referral in an agreement between the
respondent lawyer and disciplinary counsel.93 Once a respondent lawyer
completes the terms of the agreement with disciplinary counsel, the matter
is effectively dismissed.94 On the other hand, the matter may proceed
through the normal disciplinary channels when respondents decline to
participate in the diversion program or fail to fulfill the agreement.95
A number of states have amended their disciplinary procedures to
provide for alternatives to discipline, including diversion programs.96 In
these programs, complaints accusing lawyers of minor misconduct are
diverted from the disciplinary process to a program where the lawyers may

(6) the misconduct constitutes a “serious crime” as defined in [the Rules];
(7) the misconduct is part of a pattern of similar misconduct.
Id.
90. Id. R. 11(7).
91. Id.
92. Id. The pertinent factors deciding whether to refer a respondent are:
(a) whether the presumptive sanction under the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions for the violations listed in the complaint is likely to be no more severe than
reprimand or admonition;
(b) whether participation in the program is likely to benefit the respondent and
accomplish the goals set forth by the program;
(c) whether aggravating or mitigating factors exist; and
(d) whether diversion was already tried.
Id. R. 11(7)(3).
93. Id. R. 11(2).
94. See id. R. 11(7)(6) (“[D]isciplinary complaint shall be held in abeyance [dismissed] pending
successful completion of the terms of the contract.”).
95. See id. R. 11(7)(7)(b) (“A material breach of the contract shall be cause for termination of
the respondent’s participation in the program . . . [and] disciplinary proceedings may be resumed or
reinstituted.”).
96. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative
Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 264 (2012) (describing how jurisdictions used different
methods to resolve less serious complaints).
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obtain guidance, education, and monitoring.97 Some form of diversion
program currently exists in twenty-four states, plus the District of
Columbia.98 Although a jurisdiction may narrow the eligibility for a
diversion program to lawyers suffering from some impairment, the vast
majority of the jurisdictions allow participation by lawyers suffering from
impairment or struggling with practice management problems.99
A survey of rules for diversion programs reveals that many share
common features.100 As a starting point, the rules clarify the eligibility for
participation in the program. Some states use the term “minor
misconduct” to refer to the general category of matters that may be
diverted.101 Other states describe with more specificity the types of
misconduct that may result in diversion.102
97. See, e.g., Susie Morgan, When Bad Things Happen to Basically Good Lawyers: LSBA Program
Offers “Alternative to Discipline” Assistance, 46 LA. B. J. 388, 388 (1999) (describing the features of the
Louisiana State Bar Association (LSBA) program). In Louisiana, the Practice Assistance and
Improvement Program has two components: the Diversionary Program and the Attorney/Client
Assistance Program. The Diversionary Program handles matters after disciplinary counsel has found
misconduct and made a referral to the program. If disciplinary counsel screens a complaint and
determines that only minor misconduct has been alleged, but that it does not merit a full
investigation, disciplinary counsel may refer the matter to the Attorney/Client Assistance Program,
where practice assistance counsel will attempt to facilitate a resolution between the complainant and
the respondent. Id. at 389–90.
98. According to an internet search conducted by my research assistant in November 2013,
programs exist in the following states: Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming. Cf. Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1, 4 n.19 (2007) (identifying twenty-two jurisdictions with diversion programs).
99. In New York, three of the four Appellate Divisions have adopted rules allowing for
diversion for lawyers suffering from substance abuse or other dependency; “[t]he Bellacosa
Commission recommended the adoption of a uniform rule by all four departments” in New York.
Compare NY State Lawyers Assistance Programs, Diversion Model Rules: Diversion-to-Monitoring rule,
NYLAT, http://www.nylat.org/projects/diversionrules/index.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2014)
(outlining the recommended rules to the four departments), with NY State Lawyers Assistance
Programs, Diversion Model Rules: Comparison Matrix of Diversion Rules, NYLAT,
http://www.nylat.org/projects/diversionrules/comparison.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2014)
(displaying a comparison chart of the recommended rules and how they have been enacted).
100. The headings in the Missouri diversion rule provide a good overview of the matters
commonly covered in diversion rules: the Offer of Diversion, Diversion Program (describing available
services), Participation in the Program, Diversion Agreement, Costs of Diversion, Effect of Diversion,
Effect of Successful Completion of the Diversion Agreement, Breach of Diversion Agreement, Effect
of Rejection of Recommendation for Diversion, and Confidentiality. MO. SUPREME CT. R. 5.105
(2003),
available
at
http://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/ClerkHandbooksP2RulesOnly.nsf/0/
4db1af73e9e6731386256ca6005216df?OpenDocument.
101. FLA. B. REG. R. 3–5.3 (2004), available at https://www.floridabar.org/divexe/rrtfb.nsf/
FV/A5AD0ADA6E7E8BB285256EA7005EB692 (“Disciplinary cases that otherwise would be
disposed of by a finding of minor misconduct or by a finding of no probable cause with a letter of
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In reviewing a complaint, disciplinary counsel or a disciplinary panel
may offer the respondent the opportunity to enter the diversion program if
they determine that the matter is one that is eligible for diversion.103
Under state rules, the voluntary nature of participation by the respondent
is a key feature of the diversion program.104 The disciplinary counsel and
respondent may enter a diversion agreement or contract that specifically
sets forth the terms and conditions of the participation.105 The rules
describe the effect of a respondent successfully complying with terms of the
agreement, as well as the consequences for breaching the agreement.106
Rules vary in the manner in which they deal with costs associated with
participating in the program and the confidentiality of participation in the
program.107
Although state rules vary in the manner in which they approach
diversion, all provide an “intervention” opportunity for lawyers to obtain
assistance and deal with issues that may lead to problems in the future.108

advice are eligible for diversion to practice and professionalism enhancement programs.”).
102. See AZ. BAR, ARIZONA ATTORNEY DIVERSION GUIDELINES ADOPTED BY THE ARIZONA
SUPREME COURT, at 1–2 (2011), available at http://www.azbar.org/media/66357/diversion%20
guidelines%20effective%2001-01-11.pdf (describing cases eligible for diversion, as well as cases not
eligible for diversion).
103. See, e.g., WASH. CT. R. 6.1 (2014), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/
?fa=court_rules.display&group=ga&set=ELC&ruleid=gaelc0606.01 (noting that “disciplinary counsel
may refer a respondent lawyer to” the diversion program). In some states, a disciplinary committee
or panel can later recommend that a matter be diverted. See N.J. R. GOVERNING THE CTS., 1:20–3
(2013), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/r1-20.htm (authorizing a disciplinary
committee chair to request that the Director of the Office of Attorney Ethics divert a matter and
approve an agreement in lieu of disciplinary action).
104. See UTAH JUD. COUNCIL RULES OF JUD. ADMIN. R. 14–533 (2013), available at
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/ch14/05%20Lawyer%20Discipline/USB14-533.html
(explaining how a respondent may be referred to diversion program).
105. The Utah rule requires that the diversion contract “be supported by the respondent’s or
the respondent’s lawyer’s affidavit or declaration” setting forth the purpose for diversion and how the
specific terms of the diversion contract will address the allegation raised by the complaint. Id.
106. See KAN. SUP. CT. R. 203 (d)(2)(vi–vii) (2010), available at http://www.kscourts.org
/rules/rule-list.asp?r1=Rules+Relating+to+Discipline+of+Attorneys (stating that “formal disciplinary
procedures will resume” if the respondent fails to complete the diversion program).
107. Many state rules require the respondent to pay for the diversion program. See, e.g., WIS.
SUP. CT. R. 22.10 (5) (2013), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rule/chap22.pdf (“[T]he
attorney shall pay all costs incurred in connection with participation in an alternatives to discipline
program.”); see also id. R. 22.10(8) (noting that all files and records of diversion are confidential).
108. Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Automatic Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct to Disciplinary
Authorities: Filling the Reporting Gap, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 437, 442–43 (2012). Greenbaum explains:
If the system could better identify patterns of behavior that warrant intervention before
serious misconduct occurs, and offer remedial training to help solve incipient problems,
that would significantly benefit lawyers, clients and the profession. To the extent that the
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Rather than having to deal with misconduct after it occurs, participation in
a diversion program advances public protection by preventing
problems.109
By entering into an individualized diversion agreement, lawyers obtain
guidance, support, and tools to meet their particular needs.110 Because
participation is voluntary, lawyers are likely to be open to
recommendations on how to improve their practices.111
Long-term diversion saves time and money if the remedial training
helps lawyers avoid future misconduct and complaints.112 Even in the
short term, diversion may cost less than processing a complaint through
the formal disciplinary process.113
Both disciplinary counsel and respondent counsel have commented on
the value of diversion program in protecting the public by helping lawyers
change how they practice.114 Bar journal articles have discussed the value
of diversion programs as an alternative to discipline.115

present contraction of the legal market has forced more new lawyers to enter solo practice
without expertise or mentors, the need for remedial training will grow.
Id.
109. See Mark A. Armitage, Regulating Competence, 52 EMORY L.J. 1103, 1107 (2003) (urging
“courts, discipline agencies, bar associations, and the academy [to] dedicate the time and resources to
refine, enhance, and propagate programs aimed at protecting the public from [disciplinary violations]
in the first place”). Mark A. Armitage served as Associate Director of the Attorney Discipline Board
of Michigan. Id. at 1103 n.*.
110. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative
Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 271 (2012) (“An enormous benefit of such programs is that the
diversion contract can be specifically tailored to the respondent’s shortcomings to help prevent similar
violation in the future.”).
111. See id. (suggesting that respondents are more “likely to be agreeable and open to
recommendations on how to improve” their practices because they must consent to the diversion
agreement).
112. See id. at 273 (“Diversion programs using mediation do facilitate communication between
the respondent and the complainant, and the mediation may lead to a resolution more quickly than
formal disciplinary proceedings.”).
113. See id. at 271 (“Diversion programs are often cheaper and faster than formal grievance
hearings.”).
114. See, e.g., Linda Acevedo, Grievance Referral Program, How the Texas Disciplinary Counsel’s
Office Is Helping Lawyers Help Themselves, TEX. B. J., June 2013, at 521, 521 (noting that in six years,
the Texas diversion program has “become an integral part of the Texas attorney discipline system”
with more than 230 attorneys completing the program and thirty participating in the program at the
time the article was written). Mark Harrison, an experienced respondent counsel, noted that 70% of
informal charges could be diverted, rather than formally prosecuted. Diane M. Ellis, A Decade of
Diversion: Empirical Evidence that Alternative Discipline Is Working for Arizona Lawyers, 52 EMORY
L.J., 1221, 1230 (2003).
115. See Linda Acevedo, Grievance Referral Program, How the Texas Disciplinary Counsel’s Office
Is Helping Lawyers Help Themselves, TEX. B.J., June 2013, at 521, 521–22 (outlining the benefits of
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One empirical study reported on the impact of the Arizona alternative
discipline system.116 Using data from a ten-year period, the researchers
analyzed the frequency and severity of disciplinary charges filed against
lawyers after they successfully completed the diversion program.117 To
objectively measure the effectiveness of the diversion program, the study
compared the frequency and severity of disciplinary “charges filed against
lawyers who successfully completed a diversion program, as compared to”
the charges against lawyers who declined to participate in a diversion
program.118 Based on the analysis of the data, the study report concluded
that there was “a statistically significant difference in the number and
severity of subsequent disciplinary charges between lawyers who [had]
completed a . . . diversion program and those who [had] not.”119
Although these findings can be used by proponents who advocate wider
use of diversion programs, the study relied only on available records.120
This data set may not have reflected the actual number of attorneys who
were diverted and had their records expunged because they had not been
subject to new complaints for a three-year period following their
completion of a diversion program.121
the Texas diversion program); Lawyers Helping Lawyers: LSBA Program Offers Alternatives to
Discipline, LA. B. J., June 2001, at 50, 50 (“[T]he Louisiana State Bar Association’s (LSBA) Practice
Assistance and Improvement Program is a resounding success.”).
116. See Diane M. Ellis, A Decade of Diversion: Empirical Evidence That Alternative Discipline is
Working for Arizona Lawyers, 52 EMORY L.J., 1221, 1222 (2003) (stating that the study’s purpose
was “to evaluate the impact diversion has had on Arizona’s lawyer regulatory system”). Diane M.
Ellis, the Director of the State Bar of Arizona Law Office Management Assistance Program, and
member Assistance Program also noted that the information from the study helped State Bar
executives evaluate decisions about programs and resources, while giving Lawyer Assistance personnel
concrete data to use in designing diversion programs. Id. Ms. Ellis also suggested that the study
would help lawyers evaluate whether they should participate in a diversion program and proactively
seek management assistance. Id.
117. See id.at 1221 (analyzing “data from the time the State Bar of Arizona’s Law Office
Management Assistance Program (LOMAP) was established in April 1992 to April 2002”).
118. Id. at 1252.
119. Id. at 1255. Another finding was that neither “the breadth of [the] assessment [n]or the
length of . . . participation” by the lawyer appears to be critical, but extensiveness of the terms of the
agreement “appear[ed] to have a much clearer link with desirable results.” Id. at 1265.
120. Id.
121. In an insightful article examining public access to information on lawyer discipline,
Professor Leslie Levin pointed to this limitation in the Arizona diversion study. See Leslie C. Levin,
The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 5 (2007) (cautioning that
“little is known about how well diversion programs work generally or how well individual diversion
options work”). In pointing out limitations in the study, Professor Levin also noted that “the
‘control group’ against which recidivism rates were compared included lawyers who did not qualify
for diversion because their offenses were too serious.” Id. at 5 n.26. She also explained that “the
study did not account for the how the absence” or existence of prior discipline or the lack thereof
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In order to better assess recidivism by lawyers who complete a diversion
program, administrators of these programs should maintain records for a
longer period of time, or at least maintain them for statistical purposes.122
Such statistical information provides a more complete picture for research,
and helps us understand the extent to which diversion experiences impact
the manner in which lawyers practice and discharge their responsibilities.
As disciplinary authorities evaluate their current diversion programs or
consider establishing new diversion programs, they can take steps to
address other public protection issues related to diversion. One such
concern relates to whether diversion programs improperly shield lawyers by
allowing them to escape formal discipline and a record that would later be
an aggravating factor if the lawyer is faced with disciplinary charges.123
To deal with this criticism, diversion rules can provide that records related
to diversion agreements “remain confidential and not available to the
public . . . [but that] the information may be considered in any future
disciplinary matters” evaluated by disciplinary authorities.124
Another consumer concern relates to the treatment of persons whose
filed complaints are referred to diversion programs. In discussing the
virtues of restorative justice, one commentator explained that diversion
programs’ emphasis on the rehabilitation and the future may ignore the

affected the disciplinary counsel’s evaluation of subsequent complaints. See id. (noting the relevance
because expunging the records may contribute to disciplinary counsel assuming that the respondent
lawyer had a “clean” record). If lawyers with expunged records receive leniency because disciplinary
counsel believe that the lawyers had not previously engaged in questionable conduct, this could skew
the numbers related to the impact of diversion is preventing future misconduct. Id.
122. To monitor the recidivism rate of lawyers who successfully complete diversion, Kansas
maintains annual statistical records of the number of complaints assigned to the Attorney Diversion
Program. See KAN. SUP. CT. R. 203(d)(3)(i) (2010), available at http://www.kscourts.org/rules/rulelist.asp?r1=Rules+Relating+to+Discipline+of+Attorneys (specifying that the information should
include “the final disposition[], the number of diversion agreements reached, the number of
complaints returned to the traditional disciplinary process, and the success or failure of [r]espondents
in completing their diversion” programs).
123. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative
Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 271 (2012) (warning that the public may not learn about some
repeat offenders who game diversion programs to their advantage).
124. Kansas uses such an approach, noting that successful completion of a diversion program is
“reported back to the Review Committee” and will result in the dismissal of the complaint, but in
future disciplinary matter the Disciplinary Administrator may consider the information as “prior
discipline.” KAN. SUP. CT. R. 203(d)(2)(vi) (2010), available at http://www.kscourts.org/rules/rulelist.asp?r1=Rules+Relating+to+Discipline+of+Attorneys. In Iowa, upon successful completion of a
diversion program, the board dismisses the complaint, the attorney shall not be considered
“disciplined, but the attorney’s admission of misconduct may be considered in imposing sanctions” if
the attorney is later disciplined. R. P. IOWA SUP. CT. ATT’Y DISCIPLINARY BOARD 34.13(5) (2005).

3 FORTNEY_GERMANO_FINAL_CLEAN

136

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

6/24/2014 11:06 AM

[Vol. 4:112

past and complainants’ desire to tell their stories.125 Failure to provide
complainants with information on diversion can heighten their frustration
and disappointment first with their treatment by their lawyers, and then
their treatment in the disciplinary system.126 To avoid this risk, some
diversion rules require that complainants be provided notice of the
diversion decision and an opportunity to comment.127
States that do not have diversion programs should seriously consider
adopting rules that allow for diversion for practice management concerns.
New rules and programs can be designed to address the criticism of aspects
of current approaches. For example, the disciplinary procedure rules can
provide for more communication with complainants so that they better
appreciate the value of diversion in preventing future misconduct.128
More communication on the alternatives to discipline can also help shape
perspectives so that lawyers better understand the educational role of
disciplinary authorities.129
For new diversion programs, as well as existing ones, audits or selfassessments can play an important role in helping lawyers systematically
evaluate how they can improve and manage their law practices. As
indicated by the research on the new regulatory regime in Australia, there
was a significant reduction in complaints for firms that completed the
SAP.130 My own research revealed that the majority of respondents took
125. Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative
Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 271 (2012) (pointing out that the diversion process leaves out
the complainant and other stakeholders).
126. See id. (stating that because the specific dispute that led to the complaint might never be
resolved, diversion is likely to increase “public dissatisfaction with the legal profession”).
127. For example, the Wyoming Rule states:
The complainant, if any, shall be notified of the proposed decision to refer the respondent
to diversion. The complainant shall have fifteen (15) days from the date of notice to
submit to Bar Counsel a written comment thereon. The complainant also shall be
notified when a complaint or formal charge is diverted. Decisions to divert are not
appealable.
DISCIPLINARY CODE WYO. ST. B. (14)(c) (2012), available at, http://www.courts.state.wy.us/
CourtRules_Entities.aspx?RulesPage=DisciplinaryCode.xml.
128. See Norman E. Veasey, Transcript from Professionalism Conference, 54 S.C. L. REV. 897,
930 (2003) (suggesting that alternatives to discipline should be communicated more among state bar
members).
129. See id. (urging more publicity of the alternatives to discipline in which the bar and
disciplinary authorities provide education and support).
130. See Victoria Rees, Transforming Regulation and Governance in the Public Interest, NOVA
SCOTIA BARRISTERS’ SOC’Y (Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/
cms/news/2013-10-30transformingregulation.pdf (discussing Australia’s approach to reducing
complaints brought against attorneys).
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steps to revise their policies, procedures, and systems following selfassessment and close to fifty percent adopted new policies, procedures, and
systems.131 These results should help directors of diversion programs
recognize the value of conducting ethics audits and developing selfassessment tools.
Diversion programs enable lawyers to keep their records clean by taking
steps to evaluate and improve their practice management. For those
lawyers, disciplinary complaints serve as a wake-up call, motivating them
to examine how they practice and handle client business.132 Lawyers who
are not facing grievances should be able to obtain guidance and resources
from personnel with diversion and law practice management programs.133
In an effort to be proactive in educating lawyers and avoiding complaints,
bar associations should devote more resources to offices and programs that
assist lawyers with law practice management. Bar groups could follow the
lead of the Canadian Bar Association in developing an online tool for
lawyers to voluntarily examine their practices and systems.134 Rather than
relying on voluntary self-assessment, progressive jurists who embrace the
concept of proactive regulation might establish a NSW-style program as a
complement to discipline.135
131. See Susan Saab Fortney, Am I My Partner’s Keeper? Peer Review in Law Firms, 66 U.
COLO. L. REV. 329, 363 (1995) (describing the self-assessment model authorized by the ALI-ABA to
be used by practitioners).
132. See KAN. SUP. CT. R. 203(d)(1)(i) (2010), available at http://www.kscourts.org/rules/rulelist.asp?r1=Rules+Relating+to+Discipline+of+Attorneys (portraying how a diversion rule could allow
a respondent to request that a complaint be referred to diversion).
133. As explained by Professor Ted Schneyer, Law Office Management Programs generally
serve two functions: (1) a reactive one of handling a matter referred by disciplinary counsel, and (2) a
proactive one in “advising lawyers who voluntarily seek their assistance on matters such as” office
management. Ted Schneyer, The Case for Proactive Management Based Regulation to Improve
Professional Self-Regulation for U.S. Lawyers, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 233, 263–64 (2013).
134. CBA Ethical Practice Self-Evaluation Tool, THE CAN. BAR. ASS’N., available at
http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/pdf/ethicalselfevaluation-e.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014). The
online tool sets forth ten objectives under the following general categories: (1) Relationship to
Clients; (2) Relationship to Students, Employees, and Others; and (3) Relationship to Regulator,
Third Parties, and the Public Generally. Id. The introduction to the tool explains that the
Professional Responsibility Committee prepared the “Ethical Practices Self-Evaluation Tool to assist
Canadian law firms and lawyers to systematically examine the ethical infrastructure that supports
their legal practices . . . [t]he goal of the Self-Evaluation Tool is not to be prescriptive but rather to
encourage exploration and discussion of firm practices.” Id. For each objective, the tool outlines
“possible questions to ask in assessing compliance with” the objective and “potential systems and
practices to ensure that the objective is met.” Id. In addition, the tool links available online resources
that lawyers may consult for additional guidance. Id.
135. See Ted Schneyer, The Case for Proactive Management Based Regulation to Improve
Professional Self-Regulation for U.S. Lawyers, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 233, 264 (2013) (suggesting that
courts establish proactive NSW-style programs as a complement to reactive discipline). Professor
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Short of imposing some type of self-assessment, courts, legislators,
regulators, bar leaders, and insurers should take other steps to create
incentives for lawyers to devote time and resources to serious examination
of their practices. The following section discusses the role of insurance
carriers in encouraging lawyers to examine and improve their management
controls and systems.
C. Insurers’ Role in Promoting Self-Assessment and Development of Systems
For decades, legal malpractice insurers have played an important role in
encouraging ethical conduct by lawyers.136 Some commentators have
examined the impact of insurers, examining how insurers have emerged as
informal regulators of lawyer conduct.137 When it comes to risk
management, the insurers’ influence takes different forms.
Insurers’ influence on the conduct of lawyers starts with the application
for insurance that lawyers must complete to obtain insurance.138 The
policy application asks a number of questions, seeking information to
enable the insurer to evaluate whether the insurer will assume the risk of
writing a policy, and if so, the price and terms of the coverage.139 In
addition to asking general information about the prospective insured,
policy applications request information relating to firm practices, policies,
and systems. Common questions require applicants to describe their
conflict of interest and docket control systems.140 Insurance underwriters

Schneyer further claims that a NSW-style program could be expected to cut down substantially on
complaints for unprofessional conduct by “encouraging and helping firms to adhere to policies,
procedures, and systems designed to forestall acts and omissions that generate those complaints.” Id.
136. See Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 224 (1996) (suggesting that insurers have had an impact on attorney ethical
conduct for years).
137. Compare id. at 216 (arguing that insurance companies seek to “discourage, i.e., to regulate,
conduct which the ethics codes and the ethics committees” deem to be risky by providing “express
notice to insureds that they are on their own when it comes to liability for claims arising from such
relationships”), with Charles Silver, Professional Liability Insurance As Insurance and As Lawyer
Regulation: Response to Davis, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 233, 234 (1996) (“I find Davis’s proposed
explanation unpersuasive. Insurers do not usually cite a desire to discourage risky conduct when
justifying exclusions. They argue for exclusions on straightforward grounds having to do with their
own interests.”).
138. Fritz K. Huszagh, Applying for Legal Malpractice Insurance, in LEGAL MALPRACTICE:
LAW OFFICE GUIDE TO PURCHASING LEGAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, § 6:2 (Ronald E. Mallen
ed., 2012).
139. See id. (explaining that insurers use the information disclosed on the application to
evaluate risk exposure based on underwriting guidelines, rules, and practices).
140. See id. § 6:2, § 6:14 (suggesting that most insurance applications require information
regarding how a firm controls its calendar system and screens for conflicts or interests).
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seek this information because they recognize that the “better the
procedures, the more acceptable the risk.”141 These application questions
require that lawyers examine their firms’ management systems and describe
them on policy applications.142
As a condition of obtaining insurance or a lower premium, an insurer
may require that applicant-firms complete an audit or practice review.
Such a review will help the firm determine issues to be addressed and
inform the insurer’s underwriting decisions.143
Once insured, carriers assist insured firms with risk management.144
For example, the Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society (Bermuda) Ltd.
(ALAS Ltd.), a mutual insurance company owned entirely by its insured
member firms, claims to have the most comprehensive loss-prevention
program for lawyers.145 Through the program, member firms can obtain
educational material and a range of services, including consultations with
loss prevention counsel.146
Depending on the circumstances, an insurer may provide a premium
discount for particular conduct that the insurer wants to encourage. For
example, an insurer may provide a premium credit for lawyers completing
particular training or continuing legal education programs.147 Using a
similar approach to promoting conduct that educates lawyers and lowers
liability risk, insurers should provide a premium discount for lawyers who
systematically examine their firm policies, procedures, and systems. As
indicated by the first Australian study, a self-examination process can help
address issues that lead to complaints.148 My own study revealed that the
141. See id. § 6:14 (“Today, a law firm without a conflict of interest screening system and a
calendaring system is not likely to be an acceptable risk.”).
142. See id. (“Most applications request information regarding the ‘housekeeping’ maintained
by the applicant.”).
143. If a firm’s insurance needs are complex or unique, Jody A. Harris, Senior Vice President
and Managing Director of Gallagher Lawyer Professional Risk Services, recommends that the
applicant meet with the underwriting agency. She suggests that during the meeting, the attorney
emphasize the proactive steps the firm takes to avoid claims. Jody A. Harris, Purchasing Lawyers
Professional Liability Insurance through an Independent Broker Specialist, in LEGAL MALPRACTICE:
LAW OFFICE GUIDE TO PURCHASING LEGAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, § 4, § 4:7 (Ronald E.
Mallen ed., 2012).
144. See id. § 7:3 (referring to great variance between insurers and the free services that they
offer).
145. Loss Prevention, ATT’YS LIABILITY ASSURANCE SOC’Y, INC., http://www.alas.com/public/
about_lp.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
146. Id.
147. See id. (noting that insurers often provide special workshops and seminars regarding loss
prevention).
148. See Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive

3 FORTNEY_GERMANO_FINAL_CLEAN

140

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

6/24/2014 11:06 AM

[Vol. 4:112

self-assessment process contributed to 71% of firms revising their systems,
policies, and controls and 47% adopting new systems, policies, and
procedures.149 A large percentage (42%) indicated that they strengthened
firm management following the SAP.150 These study results should
persuade insurers to take steps to encourage lawyers to examine their firms’
policies, practices, and systems as the first step in fortifying the firms’
ethical infrastructure. As noted by a veteran loss-prevention expert,
insurers already understand data.151 Therefore, insurers should take note
of research findings related to the value of self-assessments. These studies
provide support for insurers providing premium discounts for lawyers who
systematically examine firm policies, procedures, controls, and systems.
To assist firms in examining their practices, insurers could also develop
SAFs designed for firms of varying sizes.152 An online self-assessment tool
could then link other materials, such as forms, articles, and guidelines that
could assist lawyers in developing and revising their own policies,
procedures, and guidance.153 Developing an effective self-assessment tool
with supporting material involves a great investment of time and
resources.154 Some insurers, such as companies that are members of the
National Bar Related Insurance Companies, could join forces and

and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J.
152, 160–62 (2012) (determining the best way to implement a self-examination process).
149. See SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, RESULTS, at Question
12 (2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (showing that 42% of firms “[s]trengthened firm
management [upon] completion of the Self Assessment Process”).
150. Id.
151. Interview with Robert Creamer, former loss prevention counsel with ALAS, in
Charleston, S.C. (Nov. 14, 2013) (expressing the view that insurers regularly make decisions based
on data).
152. SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, RESULTS, at Question 22
(2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (revealing that many respondents from small firms
believed that the self-assessment instrument should be revised for more applicability to small and solo
practices).
153. See CBA Ethical Practice Self-Evaluation Tool, THE CAN. BAR ASS’N., available at
http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/pdf/ethicalselfevaluation-e.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014)
(providing an example of an online assessment tool with links to resources); see also TLIE Self-Audit
Conflict of Interest Checklist, TEX. LAW. INS. EXCH., available at http://tlie.org/prevention/self-auditconflicts.php (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (providing a printed self-audit booklet of which portions
are published online).
154. See generally ANTHONY E. DAVIS & PETER R. JARVIS, RISK MANAGEMENT: SURVIVAL
TOOLS FOR LAW FIRMS (2d ed. 2007) (providing an example of two legal malpractice experts who
have devoted countless hours to developing checklists included in a risk management book for
lawyers).
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collaborate on developing both self-assessment tools and related
educational material.155
Insurers who currently provide audit services or self-assessment tools may
have encountered some resistance from lawyers who expressed concern
about the discovery of the results.156 To address this concern, interested
parties should support the recognition of a self-evaluation privilege,
discussed in the next section.
D. The Role of Privileges
Results from my empirical study on law firm peer review reflected the
concern that lawyers may be reluctant to engage in an SAP if they believe
that the information developed in the process could later be discoverable
and used against them in a legal malpractice case.157 The survey
instrument asked respondents to register their opinions relating to
willingness to conduct peer review and perspectives on risks associated with
third parties obtaining peer review results.158 In the survey of managing
partners of Texas firms with ten or more lawyers, “7% [of the respondents
indicated that their firms did] not engage in formal peer review because the
results might be discoverable.”159 “[Thirty-six percent of the respondents
reported that] their firms would be more likely to institute peer review
measures if peer review communications were protected from
discovery.”160 A large percentage of respondents (86%) concurred that
“peer review should be afforded confidentiality so that third parties cannot
discover the results of peer review.”161 Analyzed together, these results
suggest that the risk of discoverability may deter some lawyers and their

155. See THE NAT’L ASS’N OF BAR RELATED INS. COMPANIES, http://www.nabrico.org (last
visited Mar. 19, 2014) (listing contact information and website links to member firms).
156. Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical Study of
Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 297 (1996).
157. See SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, RESULTS, at Question
12 (2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (indicating that approximately 84% of
respondents claimed to review their policies and procedures after completing the SAP); see also Susan
Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical Study on Law Firm Peer
Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 296–97 (1996) (explaining the results of the
empirical study related to law firm peer review).
158. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical
Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 274 (1996) (explaining
the various benefits of peer review).
159. Id. at 297.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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firms from conducting formal self-assessments, especially ones with
documentation.
To provide protection for material and information developed in a
practice review, firms or their insurers may retain the services of an outside
lawyer to audit the practice and provide an opinion letter on findings and
possible steps to improve their policies, procedures, and systems.162
Assuming that the opinion letter and related reports qualify as
communications to facilitate the rendition of legal services, the firm could
assert that the attorney-client privilege shields communications between
the outside attorney and the client—the law firm.
A firm might use a different tack, relying on the firm’s in-house general
counsel or ethics advisor to conduct the self-assessment. The ability of a
firm to successfully rely on attorney-client privilege to protect any report or
material developed by the in-house counsel turns on various factors,
including whether the self-assessment would be treated as an internal
investigation that created a conflict between the interests of the firm and
current client.163 For many years, courts rejected firms’ claims that the
attorney-client privilege protected such in-firm communications.164
Although recent court opinions have been more willing to extend
protection to in-firm communications, the law is in flux.165 Even if
courts extend protection to internal investigations conducted by in-house
counsel (to facilitate the rendition of legal services), courts could reject a
162. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 2.5 (2013 ed.)
(noting that “the use of outside counsel can provide protection of the attorney-client privilege, which
may not be available [if] inside counsel” at the firm handles risk management matters).
163. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical
Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 297–300 (1996)
(discussing the factors that early court opinions focused on when deciding whether an application of
privilege created a conflict with current firm clients).
164. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1721, 1725–27 (2005) (critiquing the early opinions and proposal for recognizing a privilege); see also
St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, PC, 746 S.E.2d 98, 108–09 (Ga.
2013) (adopting a fact-specific rule when determining whether in-firm counsel privilege exists if the
firm takes certain steps derived from Professor Chambliss’s article); Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law
Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 297–300 (1996) (tracing the early developments related to in-firm
privilege); ABA Formally Backs Attorney-Client Privilege for Consults with Law Firms’ Inside Counsel,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 28, 2013), available at http://www.bna.com/aba-formally-backsn17179876446/ (providing the revised text of the August 12, 2013 ABA House of Delegates adopted
resolution, which urged the legislature and the courts to recognize the privilege for communications
between lawyers and in-firm counsel).
165. ANTHONY E. DAVIS, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WITHIN FIRMS AND LAW
DEPARTMENTS, N.Y. L.J., 2 (2013) (examining “cases that have significantly expanded the ability of”
firms to rely on a privilege between firm lawyers and the designated firm general counsel).
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claim that the attorney-client privilege extends to routine self-examinations
or audits of firm practices, procedures, and systems.
Rather than relying on attorney-client privilege, a firm might claim that
a self-critical analysis privilege shields information developed in a firm
audit or SAP. A few U.S. courts have “recognized a privilege from
discovery in litigation for some information produced as a result of an
organization’s own internal evaluation of its operation.”166 The policy
justification for extending protection to information developed in internal
investigations is to encourage firms to critically examine their practices,
without fear that negative information would later be used against them in
litigation.167 Courts have applied the privilege in different contexts,
including cases involving medical peer review, securities violations, train
cases, and some employment discrimination cases.168 Opinions that have
applied the self-evaluation privilege have identified the following
prerequisites:
1. The critical self-analysis must have been undertaken by the parties
seeking protection;
2. The public must possess a strong interest in preserving the free flow
of the type of information sought;
3. The information must be of the type that its free flow would be
curtailed if discovery were allowed; and
4. Any document produced must have been prepared with the
expectation of confidentiality and the confidentiality must, in fact, have
been maintained.169

166. Stephen P. Pepe et al., Audit: Assessing Current Policies and Procedures Under Applicable
Laws and Regulations, in CORP. COMPLIANCE SERIES: DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE FAIR HIRING
AND TERMINATION PROGRAM 3:14 (2010–2011 ed. 2010) (citing Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc.,
50 F.R.D. 249, 14 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 759 (D. D.C. 1970), aff’d, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
Bredice was the first case in which the court applied a qualified privilege to protect a medical staff
committee’s internal communications. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto
Themselves? An Empirical Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
271, 301–02 (1996) (commenting on the Brendice opinion).
167. Stephen P. Pepe et al., Audit: Assessing Current Policies and Procedures Under Applicable
Laws and Regulations, in CORP. COMPLIANCE SERIES: DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE FAIR HIRING
AND TERMINATION PROGRAM 3:14 (2010–2011 ed. 2010) (suggesting that candid, self-critical
evaluation improves organizations’ compliance with legal requirements).
168. 9A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 4670.15 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2008).
169. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical
Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 301–02 (1996)
(explaining the origin of all four factors); see also Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises Inc., 971 F.2d 423,
426 (9th Cir. 1992) (articulating the fourth factor); Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1983) (identifying the first three factors).
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A firm that conducts an internal review should be able to satisfy each of
these prerequisites. First, the firm conducts the self-assessment or audit to
systematically evaluate and improve practices within the organization.170
Second, the public possesses a strong interest in encouraging parties to
undertake critical evaluations that promise to improve the delivery of legal
services and ethical conduct within law firms.171 Third, it is likely that
the possibility of discovery of unfavorable information would curtail riskaverse lawyers from critically examining firm practices, procedures, and
policies.172 Fourth, lawyers who conduct the examination should be
prepared to demonstrate that they did so with the expectation of
confidentiality and that they maintained the confidentiality.173
Lawyers may be able to improve the likelihood of a court recognizing
the self-critical analysis privilege by taking the following steps:
(1) maintaining the confidentiality of the audit process;
(2) writing the audit report in a general and evaluative manner; and
(3) minimizing specific factual data in the report.174

Although these actions might put a firm in a better position to assert the
self-critical analysis privilege, there is no guarantee that a court will shield
information developed in the self-examination. Therefore, lawyers and
their firms should approach the process recognizing that there is a risk of
discoverability.
To eliminate the uncertainty related to the discoverability of selfevaluation information, lawyers could follow the lead of the medical

170. See Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1983)
(discussing the first factor); see also Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto
Themselves? An Empirical Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
271, 302 (1996) (explaining how the first factor works in tandem with the other three factors).
171. See Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1983)
(illustrating the second factor); see also Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto
Themselves? An Empirical Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
271, 302–03 (1996) (detailing the impact the second factor has on the entire analysis).
172. See Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1983)
(stating the third factor); see also Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves?
An Empirical Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 303
(1996) (commenting on the impact the third factor has on the decision process).
173. See Dowling, 971 F. 2d at 426 (discussing the importance of the expectation of privacy).
To satisfy the last prerequisite, the firm should not share the results of the self-assessment with third
persons, such as insurers, if doing so would jeopardize the protection of the self-critical assessment
privilege.
174. Stephen P. Pepe et al., Audit: Assessing Current Policies and Procedures Under Applicable
Laws and Regulations, in CORP. COMPLIANCE SERIES: DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE FAIR HIRING
AND TERMINATION PROGRAM 3:14 (2010–2011 ed. 2010).
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profession and seek statutory protection, similar to that afforded to
medical peer-review communications. All states now recognize a medical
peer-review privilege to varying degrees.175 “Peer review is the process by
which healthcare providers evaluate and assess deficiencies in the quality of
physician services provided in the healthcare setting.”176 Peer-review
information is protected to encourage healthcare providers to critically and
candidly evaluate deficiencies in the quality of medical services, without
the concern that information could later be used “in a medical malpractice
case.”177 Although some might question whether the peer-review
privilege fosters a “conspiracy of silence” among doctors, physicians
maintain that protection is necessary to maximize the quality of care that
patients receive.178
Similarly, a statutory self-evaluation privilege for lawyers could serve the
public interest by creating a comfort zone so that lawyers can critically
examine and improve their practices without the fear of discovery.
Recognizing the value of such a project, a group of risk management
experts proposed a privilege for risk audits of law firms.179 “[The]
proposal was created by a now defunct organization, The Lawyer Risk
Management Association.”180 “The principal drafters were Margaret
Hepper and James C. Belding, now at Aon Affinity Insurance Services . . .
and Anthony E. Davis, now a partner in the Lawyers for the Profession®

175. See Ann B. Clairbone et al., Legal Impediments to Implementing Value-Based Purchasing in
Healthcare, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 442, 470 (2009) (examining the impact peer review has had on the
medical field); see also J. Matthew Anderson, The Medical Peer Review Privilege: Illustrative Cases of the
Public Policy Supporting the Privilege and a Practical Approach to Presenting the Case for Protection, 46
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 95, 97–99 (2010) (discussing the scope and application of the
privilege).
176. Ann B. Clairbone et al., Legal Impediments to Implementing Value-Based Purchasing in
Healthcare, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 442, 470 (2009).
177. See id. (“It serves to assure physicians that the peer review committee’s analysis of
physician performance will not be used against such physicians in a medical malpractice case.”).
178. Compare B. Abbott Goldberg, The Peer Review Privilege: A Law in Search of a Valid Policy,
10 AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 160–61 (1984) (warning that the privilege has evolved into a vehicle that
enables hospitals to conceal the evidence of their own neglect), with F. Dean Griffen, The Challenge
to Confidentiality in Peer Review, AM. COLL. OF SURGEONS, DIVISION OF ADVOC. AND HEALTH
POLICY, available at http://www.facs.org/ahp/proliab/0599a.html (last revised Oct. 28, 2011)
(referring to peer review as “an important tool used to evaluate and maximize the quality of care that
patients receive”).
179. See Email from Anthony C. Davis to Susan Fortney (Nov. 8, 2013, 10:15 A.M.) (on file
with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (stating that the proposed privilege for risk audits was drafted in
1997 by a now disbanded organization).
180. Id.; Email from James C. Belding to Anthony C. Davis, (Nov. 8, 2013, 10:21 A.M.) (on
file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal).
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practice group of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.”181 As stated in the
proposal’s Preamble, communications relating to “voluntary internal risk
management audits” are “privilege[d] from discovery or use as evidence in
any civil proceedings” so that lawyers are encouraged “to undergo
voluntary internal risk management audits of their management
policies.”182 After defining terms, the proposal sets forth the privilege as
follows: “Any privileged information prepared in connection with or which
directly relates to a risk management audit conducted in accordance with
[the definitions] is not subject to discovery or admissible in evidence in any
civil proceeding.”183 This proposal can serve as a model when advocating
for an expanded self-critical analysis privilege to cover information
developed in law firm audits and self-assessments.184
181. Email from Anthony C. Davis to Susan Fortney, (Nov. 8, 2013, 10:15 A.M.) (on file with
the St. Mary’s Law Journal); Email from James C. Belding to Anthony C. Davis, (Nov. 8, 2013,
10:21 A.M.) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal).
182. Risk Management Audits for Lawyers and Law Firms; Privilege From Discovery and Use in
Civil Proceedings, THE LAWYER RISK MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, Draft (1997) (on file with the
St. Mary’s Law Journal) (“This privilege does not exist with respect to lawyer discipline
proceedings.”).
183. See id. at Section 2 (clarifying that the privilege does not extend to firms’ records “not
prepared as part of or in connection with the risk management audit”).
184. The following is the text of the proposed privilege:
Section 1. Definitions:
(a) “Risk management audit” means a voluntary, internal assessment, evaluation or review
that is performed by a lawyer or by a partner or shareholder of a law firm, an employee of
the lawyer or law firm, or by a third party person or entity who conducts such audit or
assists the law firm in the implementation of any finding or recommendation made in
connection with such audit, and initiated by the principal, a partner or shareholder of the
law firm for the purpose (i) of determining whether the systems, policies and procedures
for the management of the law firm are adequate or appropriate to the needs of the law
firm and meet requirements of professional responsibility or (ii) of implementing any
finding or recommendation made in connection with such audit.
(b) “Risk management audit report” means any report, whether written or oral, prepared
or communicated as a result of or in response to a risk management audit. A risk
management audit report may include the following supporting information, if prepared
or developed for the primary purpose and in the course of an audit: notes and records of
observations, findings, opinions, suggestions, conclusions, drafts, memoranda, computergenerated or electronically recorded information, and surveys.
(c) “Privileged information” means a risk management audit report and any information,
opinion, communication, report or record, whether written or oral, to which the
evidentiary privilege attaches pursuant to Section 2 (a) of this Act.
(d) “Civil proceeding” and “civil action” mean any civil litigation, including but not
limited to any alternative dispute resolution procedure. “Civil proceeding” and “civil
action” does not mean lawyer professional discipline proceedings, with respect to which
the privilege established by Section 2 (a) of this Act shall not apply.
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CONCLUSION: BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS AMONG PRACTITIONERS,
REGULATORS AND INSURERS
Regulators, bar leaders, and legal ethics experts around the world are
monitoring the Australian experience with management-based regulation
of lawyers. The Australian statute allowing non-lawyer ownership of law
firms effectively pushed incorporated firms to develop their ethical
infrastructures. First, the law requires that the firms appoint a legal
practitioner director to be responsible for ethical conduct within the
organization. Second, it requires that incorporated firms implement and

Section 2. Privilege In Civil Proceedings
(a) Any privileged information prepared in connection with or which directly relates to a
risk management audit conducted in accordance with Section 1 of this Act is not subject
to discovery or admissible in evidence in any civil proceeding. Information, documents or
other records otherwise existing and available as part of the records of the law firm and not
prepared as part of or in connection with a risk management audit are not privileged in a
civil proceeding merely because such information, documents or records were presented or
considered in connection with a risk management audit.
(b) No person shall be required to disclose by way of testimony or otherwise or to produce
under subpoena or otherwise any protected information, and no such privileged
information may be used in connection with any civil action or proceeding, or in any
discovery procedure in any civil action or proceeding.
Section 3. Exception: Waiver
(a) The privilege established by Section 2 of this Act does not apply to the extent the
privilege is expressly waived by any person with authority to do so on behalf of the law
firm that ordered the risk management audit report or caused the risk management audit
to be conducted.
(b) Disclosure of any privileged information does not waive the privilege established by
Section 2 of this Act if the disclosure is made:
(i) to a person to whom the audit results are disclosed and who is either the
principal, a partner, shareholder or the employee of a law firm in connection with
whose professional practice the risk management audit was conducted;
(ii) to a legal representative of a person included within paragraph (1) hereinabove;
(iii) to an employee of a person or entity that receives any privileged information, in
the ordinary course of business and who or which is engaged in the business of
obtaining or placing professional liability insurance coverage or which is engaged in
the business of insuring, underwriting, or indemnifying attorneys; or
(iv) subject to the terms of a confidentiality agreement between the lawyer or the
law firm which ordered the risk management audit or caused the risk management
audit to be conducted and a third party where such disclosure is made to such third
party for the purpose of obtaining advice or assistance from such third party in the
implementation of any finding or recommendation made in connection with a risk
management audit report.
Id. at Section 1 to Section 3.
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maintain AMS. Because the statute does not define the systems or manner
for determining compliance, the regulator worked with interested parties,
including practitioners and legal malpractice insurers, to develop a
regulatory regime. In collaboration, stakeholders developed ten objectives
of good practice as well as an SAP for incorporated firms to evaluate and
rate their compliance with the objectives. This process enables lawyers to
systematically learn about management controls and obtain guidance from
the regulators.
Early studies evaluating the “education toward compliance” approach
revealed a relationship between firms’ completion of the self-assessment
process and a significant reduction of the number of complaints filed
against lawyers in the firm. To obtain more data on the effects of the selfassessment process, I conducted a two-phase study. As discussed above,
the study revealed that the self-assessment process contributed to
development of management systems within firms. The greatest reported
impact was on firm management and risk management. Taken together,
results from these studies make a compelling case for implementing
proactive approaches to regulation.
Implementation of management-based principles can help transform a
lawyer disciplinary system from a reactive one to a proactive one that
educates and assists lawyers in conducting their practices ethically and
efficiently. To start the process of integrating management-based
approaches, regulators and insurers can encourage self-assessment and
educational initiatives to assist lawyers in improving their management
practices, avoiding complaints, and lowering malpractice exposure. They
should create programs and incentives for lawyers to examine their firms’
practices and controls. At the same time, they should seek to address
disincentives, such as the risk of discoverability from results of the selfexamination or audit.
The steps outlined in Part III of this Article can help regulators and
insurers reshape their relationships with lawyers and the public. Through
educational programs, insurers and regulators work with lawyers—not
against them. They effectively partner with lawyers in assisting them to
develop management systems and practice controls. This approach
promises to protect the public more than the current disciplinary system in
which aggrieved persons obtain limited assistance and redress. Rather than
relying on a reactive system that processes complaints after misconduct
occurs, clients and the public will fare much better if regulators and
insurers work with firm and bar leaders to create programs that help
lawyers improve their practices by avoiding problems before they happen.
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